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Spatial and Temporal Analysis of Crude Oil Theft in the Niger Delta 
 
Abstract 
 
This research sought to investigate patterns and correlates of the under-researched crime of 
crude oil theft (COT) in the context of the Niger Delta. The aim was to examine the feasibility 
of opportunity-, deprivation- and market-value-based explanations for COT patterns.  A total 
of 1039 incidents of COT recorded by the Nigerian Oil Producers’ Trade Section in 2012-2014 
were analysed. The results indicate that even when controlling for clustering of the oil 
pipeline infrastructure, spatial clustering of COT was statistically significant indicating 
manipulation of vulnerable situational contexts. No significant correlation was found 
between COT and the local unemployment or poverty rate. Finally, there was a moderate, 
significant positive temporal association between the volume of crude oil stolen and the 
international market price.  The findings provide evidence that COTs are likely perpetrated by 
rationally motivated offenders and suggest that situational crime prevention and market 
reduction approaches show promise in proactively curtailing criminal opportunities. 
 
Key words: Crude Oil Theft; spatial clustering; hot products; situational prevention; market 
reduction approaches. 
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Introduction 
The empirically underexplored crime of crude oil theft (COT), which is billed as an organised 
crime associated with oil exploration and extraction, occurs in a number of locations world-
wide, but in the research undertaken in this paper is conducted within the particular context 
of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. To demonstrate the extent of the problem in this location, 
according to the country’s former finance minister, the menace culminates in losses of about 
$12 billion annually (Okonjo-Iweala, 2014).  Unfortunately, the problem persists despite 
efforts by government and oil companies to assuage the perceived causes and influencing 
factors of the crime (Watts, 2007; Oluwaniyi, 2011; Renouard and Lado, 2012). COT is neither 
a ubiquitous phenomenon in all the oilfields, nor is it randomly distributed; rather, it clusters 
at specific ‘hot spots’ and also demonstrates varying patterns over time. There are a number 
of explanations for the existence of these clusters including temporal and geographic 
variation in socio-political and economic factors and patterns in the manifestation of 
opportunities for this type of theft. This paper examines the spatial and temporal pattern of 
COT in the Niger Delta, tests the viability of these alternative explanations and then discusses 
the implications that the results have for the practice of reducing theft of this type. 
 
Crude Oil Theft in Context 
 
Extraction of crude oil in the Niger region is enabled by a network of onshore oil wells, 
pipelines and flow stations located in the creeks of the mangrove forests.  These onshore oil 
infrastructures are connected through pipelines to export terminals and offshore oil 
platforms. According to Nigeria’s Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), there are 
currently about 2,800 oil wells connected to 130 flow stations in 218 oil fields (DPR, 2015). 
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Transportation of extracted crude oil is through a largely vulnerable 4,441 km pipeline 
network (DPR, 2015). To a certain extent, the locations of the oil infrastructure exposes them 
to disruption through perennial vandalism. This is mostly because criminals exploit the 
existing infrastructure by breaching oil pipelines, and siphoning crude oil for sale on the 
international black market or for local unconventional artisanal refining (Onuoha, 2007). The 
international black market for stolen crude oil is speculated to be underpinned by demands 
for cheap oil by certain foreign refining businesses seeking to maximise profits through 
transnational organised criminality (Asuni, 2009). 
 
The swamps of the Niger Delta mangrove forest make mass COT possible in two principal 
ways. First, offenders bore holes into any portion of the vulnerable pipelines and siphon oil 
onto floating storages such as propelled wooden boats or towed barges (Katsouris and Sayne, 
2013). These are either transferred further offshore onto larger ocean carrier vessels or locally 
refined. A second method is for offenders to insert hoses into pipelines to siphon oil directly 
into large storage boats that can navigate in ultra-shallow waters. Thereafter, stolen products 
are transferred directly into larger carrier vessels which are anchored offshore (Katsouris and 
Sayne, 2013). These acts cumulatively amount to product losses of about 400,000 barrels per 
day as noted by the Vice President of Nigeria (Kayode, 2015). 
 
Socio-political factors influencing Crude Oil Theft  
Collier (2008) traces the root causes of resource related delinquencies, such as COT, in poorer 
countries to defective political economics of resource exploitation. The solution to these 
problems, according to Collier (2008), lie in public policy instruments such as economic 
restructuring and/or political reforms.  Similarly, Davis (2009) and Obi (2010) contend that 
problems in resource exploitation culminated into political violence in the 1990s, which 
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exacerbated COT within the Niger Delta. Onuoha (2008) however, argues that COT is not a 
direct product of socio-political problems because it had long existed before the surge in 
political violence, and it only became worrisome due to increasingly high theft volumes. 
Ikelegbe (2005) integrates these ideas and concludes that COT might be spurred by local 
politicians seeking to empower their supporters while also reaping some financial benefits in 
the process.      
 
Other perspectives by Ufuoma and Omoruyi (2014) contend that motivation for COT might 
be based on moral justification. This is largely attributable to beliefs that multinational oil 
companies and the government seek to exploit their natural resources at the expense of the 
local population. As a result, those with such dispositions do not consider COT to be a crime, 
but rather a morally justified action. It follows that those under the most stress are likely to 
succumb to the view that such theft is acceptable.  This delinquent behaviour is similarly 
explained by Sykes and Matza (1957), who suggest that such criminal dispositions are 
underpinned by “unrecognised extension of defences to crimes in the form of justifications 
for deviance that are valid by the delinquent” (p.666).  These defences according to Sykes and 
Matza (1957), are operationalised as techniques of neutralisation which manifest by persons 
involved in COT denying any responsibility for their action, or even believing that their 
behaviour does not result in any significant harm. They further see themselves as avengers 
who justify their acts by repressing their wrongdoings through a belief that those who 
condemn them have motives and intentions that are against them.  
 
In terms of demographic factors, Onuoha (2009); Garuba (2010), as well as Oteh and Eze 
(2012), argue in favour of the view that high unemployment and poverty ratios, as well as 
poor standards of living, are associated with COT. Relatedly, Asuni (2009) also believes that 
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poverty-related issues need to be addressed, but concede that COT is not likely to be entirely 
motivated by poor socioeconomic conditions. As a consequence of considering the social, 
economic and political factors, Watts (2009) and Davidheiser and Nyiayaana (2011), among 
others, believe that the solution to COT lies in ameliorating the distal socio-political causes.  
 
Economic Influences on Crude Oil Theft  
COT has been characterised as being very probably influenced by the international market 
price of the commodity which incentivise and motivate theft syndicates (Asuni, 2009). Despite 
research on how the crime is carried out (Ikelegbe, 2005; Davis, 2009; Garuba, 2010; Obi, 
2010; Katsouris and Sayne, 2013), little focus has been given on how market prices might be 
influencing it. However, research on the impact of market value on similar crimes- and thefts 
in particular- has been conducted. Sutton’s (1995) proposed that “if more goods are being 
stolen then more stolen goods are being bought” (p.400) and argues that many acquisitive 
crimes would not occur if offenders did not believe in the marketability of their stolen 
products (Sutton, 1995).  
 
A few studies have found a link between markets and levels of theft. Stevenson et al (2001) 
found evidence in support of an association between markets for stolen items and the 
attendant supply and found minimal hindrances in trading of stolen items in either legitimate 
or illegitimate markets. Sidebottom et al (2011) examined the connections between metal 
price and metal theft found strong evidence in support of a positive association between 
copper theft in the UK and copper prices. They also note that copper theft levels are not 
statistically associated with general theft patterns and unemployment rates in the UK. Posick 
et al (2012) also found a similar relationship between prices of metals and copper theft from 
April 2008 to July 2010 in Northeast, United States. Sidebottom et al (2014) observe that 
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often, a high level of risk taking is required to steal copper cables implying that the crime is 
the tradecraft of rationally motivated predatory offenders, who are conscious of the value of 
the goods on offer. Interestingly, such risk is like those taken by crude oil thieves (Katsouris 
and Sayne, 2013), and in both cases, the perceived benefits are more likely to outweigh the 
costs when the market value is high as proposed by the rational choice perspective of 
offending behaviour (Clarke and Cornish, 1985). 
 
Where economic explanations hold, Sutton et al (2001), as well as Sutton and Simmonds 
(2004) advocate the use of ‘market reduction approaches’ (MRA) in disconnecting markets 
for illicit items and their supply. Through lack of evaluation studies, there is currently only 
limited empirical support for this approach, but what is available shows some promise.  Ashby 
and Bowers (2015) found a significant positive association between the location of scrap 
markets and areas with high levels of metal theft, which implies that shutting down the local 
market for scrap metal should reduce theft levels. Researching on a different type of desirable 
good, Schneider (2008) concluded from evaluative research that MRA had assisted in 
curtailing illicit trade in endangered wildlife. However, given the nature of the market for 
crude oil, one issue with the applicability of the MRA is the structure of the buyer network. 
Unlike a large network of scrap dealers who are not necessarily specific in what they will buy, 
agents buying crude oil are likely to be limited in number and more specialist to begin with. 
 
Opportunity-based explanations of Crude Oil Theft patterns 
It is now well established that crime clusters and that it is not evenly distributed across people 
(either victims or offenders), products or places and times (e.g. Johnson, 2010). For example, 
Sherman et al (1989) demonstrated that 4% of the addresses in Minneapolis accounted for 
53% of the calls of police service in a one-year time frame. These intensive concentrations of 
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crime are caused at least in part by the ease with which the crimes can be undertaken and it 
has been shown that there is a strong association between the amount of offending and the 
vulnerability of the targets that are available (Clarke, 2005). There is a large body of research 
in support of opportunity-based explanations, and offences that show a high degree of 
concentration over space and time are likely to be at least partially dependent on opportunity 
structure.  
 
In line with the opportunity explanation, studying the characteristics of targets that are highly 
susceptible to theft enables the categorization of the most attractive ones as ‘hot products’ 
(Clarke, 1999).  Clarke (1999) submits that such products are sought after because they are 
concealable, removable, available, valuable, enjoyable and eventually disposable (CRAVED). 
This framework guides the investigation of a broad range of CRAVED product thefts like 
timber theft in the southern Appalachian region (Baker, 2003), parrot poaching in Mexico 
(Pires and Clarke, 2012) and livestock theft in Malawi (Sidebottom, 2013). The categorisation 
of crude oil as a CRAVED product is yet to be researched comprehensively. However, Katsouris 
and Sayne (2013) provide some evidence to support its classification as a CRAVED product. 
This is because, stolen crude oil is; - concealable in mobile or static storages, removable from 
pipelines, available in vulnerable pipelines, valuable as a marketable commodity, and 
disposable as well as transferrable through sale and transportation (Katsouris and Sayne, 
2013). The enjoyable element however, does not directly apply to crude oil theft, albeit 
proceeds from the sales could be enjoyable.  
 
In exploiting opportunity-based explanations of crime, crime fighting practices and research 
in the UK, the USA, Canada and Australia have embraced the use of space and time analytic 
methods in understanding crime patterns (Graham and Bennett, 1995 and Chainey et al.  
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2008). According to Clarke (1995), this has bolstered the ability of policing agencies to 
efficiently allocate resources at well-established hotspots of crime in line with the concept of 
Situational Crime Prevention (SCP). SCP strategies are “measures that are (1) directed at 
highly specific forms of crime, (2) involve the management, design, or manipulation of the 
immediate environment in a systematic and permanent way as possible and (3) make crime 
more difficult and risky, or less rewarding and excusable as judged by a wide range of 
offenders” (Clarke, 1997). The application of such crime analytic techniques and prevention 
strategies are not well grounded in the Nigerian context, and particularly in efforts being 
made to contend with COT. Fundamentally though, the effectiveness of the SCP concept 
begins with having a thorough understanding of crime patterns in space and time.  
 
Study Aims 
Very little research has focused on the spatial and temporal patterns of crude oil theft (COT) 
and tested alternative explanations for any emerging patterns. The only exception to our 
knowledge is Anifowose et al (2012) who used spatiotemporal analysis to “quantify the 
magnitude and direction of correlation between pipeline interdiction and likely 
socioeconomic influences in Nigeria” (p.637). Their research did not find evidence in support 
of an association between pipeline breaches and socioeconomic factors such as poverty.  
However, the spatial unit of analysis used in their research were 5 aggregated regions 
(Anifowose et al, 2012), which makes the analysis necessarily crude and likely to have been 
considerably influenced by issues such as the Modifiable Areal Unit Problem (Fotheringham 
and Wong, 1991; and Holt et al, 1996) and the ecological fallacy (Robinson, 2009). 
 
This research reported here therefore sought to improve upon existing knowledge of the 
criminality of COT and the crime patterns in space and time. The objectives were to establish 
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whether COT in the Niger Delta significantly clusters and, to the degree to which this was 
possible, examine evidence for or against the distinct explanations for this theft outlined 
above. We therefore test the following hypotheses: 
H1: ‘The spatial clustering of COT is statistically significant, demonstrating that it is influenced 
by the exploitation of known criminogenic opportunities’ 
H2: ‘There is a significant association between the frequency of COT incidences in the Niger 
Delta and the ratios of poverty and unemployment in locations with high COT occurrences’. 
H3: ‘Variations in temporal patterns of the volumes of crude oil stolen are significantly 
correlated with variations of crude oil prices on the international market’.  
 
Methods 
Data 
The geographical focus area of this research was three states in the Niger Delta (Bayelsa, Delta 
and Rivers) depicted in Figure 1 along with the structure of the oil infrastructure in this region. 
These states account for at least 95 % of onshore oil production and have diverse 
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, contributing towards enhancing the 
external validity of the findings (Lashari et al, 2013). Spatial and temporal data on incidences 
of COT for the period January 2012 to December 2014 were collated from reports primarily 
made by the oil companies under the auspices of the Oil Producers’ Trade Section. Oil 
companies use diverse means to detect breaches along their pipelines. They use surveillance 
systems that sense drop in pressures in the pipelines, which are then physically investigated. 
Another means is the employment of surveillance contractors who daily monitor the entire 
lengths of pipelines to detect infractions. To protect their product, the companies proactively 
seek evidence of theft, so it is likely that the resulting statistics are fairly comprehensive. A 
total 1039 incidents were reported within the three year period studied. These incidences of 
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COT were geocoded to achieve acceptable levels of accuracy, precision, consistency and 
reliability (Chainey and Ratcliffe, 2013). The monthly volume of crude oil stolen was also 
collated for the same period, expressed as number of barrels per day (bpd). Monthly prices 
of crude oil (in US Dollars) in the international market covering the same period was based on 
the United States Energy Information Administration data1.         
(*put Figure 1 around here*).                       
Demographic and socioeconomic data were obtained from the Nigerian National Population 
Commission (NPC) and National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) respectively. Population data from 
the NPC were based on a 2006 national census2 which was extrapolated to get the current 
values for 2014 using World Bank country estimates for population growth.3 Data from the 
NBS provided the poverty4 and unemployment5 rates in each local government area (LGA) 
within the respective states. There are a total of 56 LGAs spread across the 3 states as follows: 
Bayelsa – 8 (all have pipelines) ; Delta – 25 (8 in the northern part do not have pipelines) and    
Rivers – 23 (only one does not have a pipeline). The approximate size of the LGAs are between 
100 – 600 square km, depending on the population amongst other considerations such as 
demography. There are a small number of outliers, such as Southern Ijaw LGA with a size of 
2674 sq km and a population of about 380,000 people. On average, the population counts are 
between 90,000 and 400,000 residents depending on the extent of urbanization in the 
respective LGAs.  
 
Spatial Analysis 
The spatial pattern of COT incidences was analysed using ArcGIS 10.2 software. Locations of 
COT were geocoded and aggregated to spatial units – in this case LGA within the states. The 
                                                 
1 https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=RBRTE&f=M 
2 http://www.population.gov.ng/index.php/censuses 
3 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?locations=NG 
4 http://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/pdfuploads/Nigeria%20Poverty%20Profile%202010.pdf 
5 http://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/report/375 
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aggregated data was subsequently used to produce a thematic map showing the number of 
theft cases recorded within LGA. Moran’s I global spatial autocorrelation test was conducted 
using ArcGIS 10.2 to further examine the extent of spatial clustering within the LGAs.  
CrimeStat III software was used to undertake a nearest neighbour analysis (NNA) to 
determine spatial clustering and to produce a Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) map to 
visualise the hotspot locations.  
 
Further spatial tests were carried out to identify pipelines that were most susceptible to COT 
using the principle of ‘hot routes’ (Tompson et al, 2009) and enable analysis where pipelines- 
the infrastructure in which COT events are possible - are used as the risk denominator. 
Locations of COT cases were therefore aggregated to pipelines and a heat map was produced 
showing the number of breaches per pipeline. However, considering that the pipelines 
differed in length, the relative risks of COT could be misrepresented using this metric alone. 
As a result, the average length of the pipelines (34 km; SD 24 km) was used to produce a rate 
map representing the rate of theft occurrences per 30 km of pipeline length. It was important 
to also determine if there was spatial autocorrelation of COT incidents on the individual 
pipelines.  A Moran’s I local indicators of spatial association (LISA) test was therefore 
conducted to designate the levels of significant local clustering of COT along individual 
pipelines. 
 
Regression Test and Correlation Analysis 
Multiple linear regression was used to investigate the connections between the 
unemployment, poverty ratios and incidences of COT.  This demographic data is detailed at 
the LGA level in Appendix 1. Based on the population of each LGA, the total number in 
poverty/unemployed was divided by the economically active population to produce ratios of 
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poverty and unemployment using the rates outlined in data from the NBS (Cantor and Land, 
1985). Appendix 1 also includes the number of COT cases per LGA as well as the total length 
of pipelines per LGA. These were used for tests to determine the influence of the predictors 
(unemployment, poverty and pipeline lengths) on COT at LGA level. Both the dependent 
variable and predictors were measured at the ratio level. A Shapiro-Wilk normality test for 
the distributions of the unemployment ratio (W=0.925, p<0.001) and poverty ratio (W=0.680, 
p<0.001) indicated that the data significantly deviates from normal distributions (Shapiro and 
Wilk, 1965) hence non-parametric regression was used. Tests for homoscedasticity were done 
by plotting the standardized residuals against the unstandardized predicted values. Some 
heteroscedasticity was observed on the plot but, it was not significant enough to invalidate 
the regression (Korendijk et al, 2008).  
  
Non-parametric Spearman correlation tests were used to test the association between the 
variations in volumes of crude oil stolen and the market price (Sidebottom et al, 2014).  A 
time series analysis was not appropriate in this case, as the data were not normally 
distributed.  A Shapiro-Wilk normality test for the distribution of volume of crude oil stolen 
(W=0.926, p<0.05) and the distribution of the prices of crude oil for the three year (W=0.769, 
p<0.001) demonstrated the data significantly deviates from normal distributions (Shapiro and 
Wilk, 1965). Furthermore, the mean as well as variance of each year’s data did not have 
‘stationarity’ (Allard, 1998). The assumptions of monotonic relationship between the 
variables were met, and the data was measured on ratio scales.  
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Results  
 
Figure 2 depicts the temporal pattern of COT cases for a 36-month period (2012-2014).  It 
shows a steady rise in theft cases from 2012 through 2013 into 2014.  A steep drop was 
experienced from May 2014, albeit with some occasional rises thereafter.  
(*put Figure 2 around here*).     
Figure 3 examines the monthly variation in the volume of crude oil stolen by year of study. 
For 2012, a mean of 1,702,504 (standard deviation of 976,683) barrels of crude oil per day 
(bpd), were stolen in each month.  For 2013, the median was 1,707,492 bpd (SD 480,795) and 
for 2014 the mean was 1,067,723 bpd, SD 427,108. It is apparent that though 2012 had the 
lowest number of incidents of theft (Figure 2), it also had 50% of volumes of oil stolen falling 
within a range of 1,841,663bpd or above (Figure 3). The mean volume of barrels stolen per 
day was substantially smaller for the months during 2014, demonstrating that the volume of 
oil taken per theft, and the theft of very large amounts of oil in one-time period appeared to 
have more recently reduced.   
(*put Figure 3 around here*) 
Figure 4 shows variation in the monthly prices of crude oil per barrel in the international 
market by year. In 2012 the cost of oil had monthly mean of $105.01 (SD $7.44), for 2013 the 
mean was $104.07 (SD $3.44) and in 2014, the mean was $96.25, (SD $14.54). This shows a 
small but noticeable more recent drop in the value of oil on the market.  
(*put Figure 4 around here*) 
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Spatial Distribution of Crude Oil Theft 
Figure 5 is a thematic map that depicts the amount of COT incidences within the 56 LGAs 
located in the 3 states being studied. The LGA with the highest amounts of theft are labelled. 
Southern Ijaw accounted for about 42.22% of incidents, while Brass and Nembe LGA 
experienced 10.48% and 10.17% of theft respectively. This provides evidence that the theft 
of crude oil is spatially concentrated in the Niger region. 
(*put Figure 5 around here*) 
Since COT requires the availability of oil pipeline infrastructure, theft cases per pipeline were 
investigated. Mapping this data revealed that one pipeline in Southern Ijaw LGA accounted 
for about 46.72% of all the theft cases recorded. This suggests that certain existing 
environmental as well as situational features could have made this particular pipeline more 
susceptible and attractive than others. There could be several contributory factors, 
nonetheless this provides some evidence in support of the proposition that offenders behind 
COT rationalise their actions based on envisaged costs and benefits (Clarke and Cornish, 
1985). As mentioned earlier however, the length of the different pipelines are not even which 
means the longer pipelines could experience higher levels of COT on the basis of their length 
alone. A rate map (Figure 6) was therefore produced which depicts the amount of theft per 
30 km of pipeline length. It is apparent that some pipelines experience more theft than others 
within 30 km of pipeline length, signifying substantial levels of clustering of COT based on 
exploitable environmental and situation conditions.  Interestingly the pipeline in Southern 
Ijaw LGA has the greatest rate of COT per 30km as well as the largest number of COTs for a 
single pipeline showing high concentration of offences across several metrics. Appendix 2 
gives the rate of theft per 30km of pipeline within each of the respective LGAs.  
(*put Figure 6 around here*). 
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Spatial Clustering of Crude Oil Theft 
The first research question proposed above was to investigate whether the rate of COT was 
influenced by exploitation of criminal opportunities, which we argued would be evident if 
there was statistically significant spatial clustering. Firstly, a nearest neighbour analysis test 
produced a nearest neighbour index of 0.1893 with standard error of 55.55. This spatial 
clustering was statistically significant (z=-42.61, p<0.001) which implied that locations where 
COT occurred were closer to each other than would be expected based on chance, (Ratcliffe, 
2005).  Likewise, a Moran index to determine the existence of positive spatial autocorrelation 
between vulnerable pipelines was statistically significant (z=6.34, p<0.0001). This signified 
that pipelines which experienced high cases of COT and were surrounded by other pipelines 
that recorded high theft cases also. The hotspots as well as hot pipelines of COT (see Figure 7 
for a visualisation), reveal spatial patterns which support the proposition that COT is likely a 
resultant effect of the convergence of offenders - crude oil thieves, and the target - crude oil, 
in places with vulnerable oil infrastructure (Clarke and Webb, 1999; Clarke and Eck, 2005).   
(*put Figure 7 around here*). 
Further investigations into the spatial clustering of COT incidences revealed that locations 
where COT clustered, were positively (Moran’s I = 0.20) spatially auto-correlated with other 
locations of COT.  Based on the statistically significant z-score of 4.83, there is less than 1% 
likelihood (p<0.001) that this clustered pattern of COT incidences could have happened by 
chance. Tests were also carried out to investigate significant spatial clusters within the 
pipelines themselves, which controls for the dependency of this crime on the physical pipeline 
infrastructure. The Moran index was 0.74 (z=6.34, p<0.0001) which signified existence of a 
statistically significant positive spatial autocorrelation between the most vulnerable 
pipelines, and hence the existence of clusters of high theft pipelines.  The crime pattern is 
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clearly not ubiquitous, and it therefore supports this research’s propositions that the crime is 
influenced by infrastructure-enabled targeted criminality.  
 
 
Relationships between Crude Oil Theft, Poverty and Unemployment 
The second research aim of this paper was to establish if there was any significant association 
between the frequency of COT incidences in the Niger Delta and the ratios of poverty and 
unemployment within each LGA. The total lengths of pipelines within each LGA was also 
added as a predictor to control for the disproportional lengths of pipelines across the LGAs.  
A linear regression demonstrated that in combination, the poverty and unemployment ratios 
including the lengths of pipelines accounted for 26.2 % of the variation in COT across the LGAs 
demonstrating the weak explanatory value of these variables [R=0.550, R2=0.303, F (3,52) 
=7.518, p<0.001]. No significant positive associations were found for either the 
unemployment ratio (β=-0.015, t=-0.13, ns) or the poverty ratio (β= -.192, t=-1.540, ns). There 
was however a stronger positive but still insignificant association between the length of 
pipeline per LGA and COT (β=0.457, t=3.69, ns). A more parsimonious model using the length 
of pipeline per LGA as a single predictor of COT [R=0.518, R2=0.268, F (1,54) =19.778, p<0.001] 
recorded a significant positive association between the two variables (β=0.518, t=4.45, 
p<0.001). This result supports findings of a similar research by Anifowose et al (2012) that 
there is no correlation between socioeconomic factors like poverty/unemployment and 
pipeline interdiction crimes in Nigeria. It further shows that when disaggregated, 
relationships between crime and socioeconomic indicators are relatively weak (Janko and 
Popli, 2015). This challenges perspectives advanced by Onuoha (2009); Garuba (2010) and 
Oteh and Eze (2012) that use aggregated socioeconomic indicators to postulate that COT 
might be influenced by unemployment and poverty rates.  More importantly though, it 
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supports views that argue for more attention in controlling the proximal causes of crime as 
against the distal ones (Wortley, 2012) and the significance of the exposure variable alone 
(length of available pipeline) in predicting levels of COT strengthens the case for the view that 
this type of crime is at least in part opportunity related.    
 
Relationships between Crude Oil Theft and International Market Price 
The final research aim was to establish whether variations in temporal patterns of volumes of 
crude oil stolen were significantly correlated with variations in crude oil prices in the 
international market.  A Spearman Rho’s test was run to determine the measure of 
association between the 36 months’ variations of the volume of crude oil stolen and the price. 
There was a moderate, statistically significant positive association (rs = 0.528, p=0.001, n=36) 
between the volume of crude oil stolen and the price in the 36 month period. This correlation 
provides evidence in support of the proposition that COT could be influenced by rationalised 
cost and benefit calculations (Clarke and Cornish, 1985). Offenders therefore appear likely to 
engage in COT based on theft opportunities, commodity prices, as well as market availability. 
There is therefore evidence in support of the price-theft association within the context of 
COT.  
 
Discussion 
Application of SCP 
The research findings suggest that a problem orientated strategy with a focus on the hotspots 
of COT could be useful in addressing this type of crime. For instance, there are contiguous 
clusters of LGAs like Brass, Nembe and Southern Ijaw which all had high incidences of COT of 
(103, 100 and 415 respectively) most likely in response to favourable situational conditions 
for theft (See Appendix 1). As expected, in general, in areas with more available pipeline there 
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is more COT, demonstrating that overall exposure to oil infrastructure is a significant 
facilitator.  However, the fact that particular situational circumstances that are as yet 
unmeasured are key is supported by the fact that some LGAs with similar terrains and more 
pipelines, like Warri South West, did not record relatively high incidences (See Appendix 1).  
It is also evident that the rate of theft for every 30 km length of pipeline is quite high in some 
LGAs (e.g. Ekeremor, Degema and Akuku Toru) demonstrating a significant spatial clustering 
of COT onto certain regions of the pipeline (See Appendix 2).   
 
The most general implication of the research findings reported above is that understanding 
the spatial, temporal and spatiotemporal patterns of COT, is foundational in efforts to curtail 
the crime. It enables better appreciation of the problem and supports implementation of deft 
response initiatives based on principles of SCP. These principles articulate how response can 
be proactive by manipulating environmental conditions by increasing the efforts and risks 
involved in committing crimes, as well as reducing the rewards and removing excuses   (Clarke, 
1995 and Clarke, 1997). There is recent evidence of some movement towards such 
approaches. For instance, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation has initiated policies 
to enhance surveillance of critical oil infrastructure using drones (Alegbe, 2015). With a better 
understanding of the significant spatial clustering and spatiotemporal pattern of COT, the use 
of drones at well-established hotspots will be most effective in increasing the efforts and risk 
involved in COT. The challenges to the implementation of SCP techniques in stemming COT 
are no doubt daunting considering the terrain, as well as the complex operating environment 
exacerbated by tense relationships between the oil companies and host communities. It also 
seems likely in this context that monitoring will be mainly undertaken by companies 
themselves rather than local police or other stakeholders. The legitimacy of the companies as 
crime preventers will therefore be a key factor in the success or failure of interventions. 
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 Another possibility which might enhance prevention is to look at the application of market 
reduction approaches as a viable strategy since there is evidence in support of the price-theft 
hypothesis.  For crimes like COT however, the application of MRAs could be quite challenging 
because the black markets are not clear. As mentioned earlier, it is also likely that the 
structure of the market is not as widely distributed as for other forms of theft. Given the 
‘specialist’ nature of oil sales, it is less likely that thieves rely on casual interactions with 
‘nearby’ buyers but more on established relationships or steal oil for their own consumption, 
making general market regulation a less impactful strategy.   
 
A further challenge comes with the difficultly of identifying illegally sourced crude oil. 
Nevertheless, Clarke (2004) argues that “technology changes everything, crime included” 
(p.55). The efficacy of technological approaches to crime reduction have been well-evidenced 
in stemming vehicle theft for example (Farrell et al , 2011).  Since crude oil types have 
different characteristics and spectral signatures, finger printing technologies can be used to 
identify crude oil from their origins (Hegazi et al, 2005). Doing this would ensure that 
refineries and markets through due diligence became better aware of the source of their 
crude oil. In turn this could lead to more stringent regulation of crude oil traders and a 
reduction in readily available channels for the onwards sale of stolen crude oil.  
 
Research Limitations 
This research had some limitations that should be articulated. First, the use of socioeconomic 
data of the LGA within which the oil pipes are located presupposes that COT offenders are 
located and motivated from within these communities. However, whilst this cannot be tested 
with the available data, this does not appear to be an unrealistic assumption, as it is 
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considered impracticable to execute such crime without some local community support and 
connivance.  
 
Second, this research was unable to assess the different environmental and situational 
circumstances that specifically create the opportunities for COT, due to lack of information at 
the micro-setting level. For example, some locations of theft are highly likely to be selected 
because of inadequate security measures amongst other criminogenic factors, which would 
make them vulnerable to repeat victimisation. An examination of these factors would have 
enhanced the findings reported here by providing more information about the specific 
characteristics of locations routinely victimised.  A possibility that was explored was using 
proximity to features such as settlements or roads to look for micro-level commonalities 
across COT locations. Unfortunately the lack of geo-referenced micro-level data sets on roads 
and settlements in this area of Nigeria precluded this further analysis. Neither is the mangrove 
terrain conducive to make this an easily achievable geo-coding task.    
 
Future Research 
This research has brought to the fore some issues which form plausible areas for future 
research. The knowledge of where COT clusters and of its spatiotemporal pattern could be 
complemented with an understanding of where the crime might occur in the future. Research 
could therefore explore the usefulness of prospective hotspot mapping to predict locations 
likely to be targets of COT (e.g. Bowers et al, 2004). Future qualitative research could use 
interviews and questionnaires to sample local perspectives on COT, and question arrested 
COT offenders to get their views on how they rationalise the cost and benefits of their actions. 
This could also probe for further understanding of the role of political economics (Collier 
2008) and the publics’ belief about the equity of resource exploitation.  Having identified 
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some hotspots in this research, and identified SCP methods as a crime prevention strategy for 
COT, it would also be helpful to investigate whether in this context for this crime type, security 
responses in one location could lead to crime displacement to another (Guerette and Bowers, 
2009).  
 
Conclusion 
The central aim of this research was to investigate the spatial and temporal pattern of COT. 
This is considered critical to efforts aimed at curtailing the crime, while also contributing to 
broader knowledge on the form of this type of criminality.  The research results identified 
locations and pipelines where COT significantly clusters and further established that the crime 
patterns were spatially auto-correlated. The significance of this spatial clustering supports the 
proposition that offenders are likely to be exploiting favourable environmental and 
situational circumstances. The findings also suggested that COT is driven at least in part by 
the market value of crude oil, indicating a need to be vigilant whilst prices are unusually high. 
Spatially and temporally specific SCP techniques target hardening and improving surveillance 
in vulnerable situations should reap crime reduction benefits. There is less support here for 
evidence of theft levels being driven by unemployment and poverty rates in the nearby 
community.  
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APPENDIX 1 
DEMOGRAPHIC DETAILS OF LGAs STUDIED 
 
 
Serial State LGA Name Size (Sq Km) Population
Poverty Ratio 
(Fraction of total 
population in poverty) 
Unemployment 
ratio              
(Fraction of total 
population 
unemployed) 
Number of COT 
Reports
Total Length of 
Pipelines/LGA(KM)
1 Bayelsa Southern Ijaw 2674 379412 0.439999262 0.213000643 415 126.93
2 Bayelsa Ekeremor 1801 317844 0.439998867 0.213000717 31 52.10
3 Bayelsa Kolokuma/Opokuma 361 93455 0.43999786 0.21300091 0 2.90
4 Bayelsa Yenegoa 704 415344 0.439999133 0.212999345 27 49.08
5 Bayelsa Sagbama 943 220319 0.439998366 0.213000241 9 17.90
6 Bayelsa Brass 1409 217085 0.439998157 0.212999516 103 49.77
7 Bayelsa Ogbia 695 211755 0.439999056 0.213000874 8 49.08
8 Bayelsa Nembe 758 154409 0.440000259 0.212999242 100 95.49
9 Delta Ndokwa West 815 176878 0.539999322 0.212999921 1 4.50
10 Delta Sapele 450 205468 0.540001363 0.213001538 0 21.45
11 Delta Aniocha North 407 122689 0.539999511 0.213001981 0 0.00
12 Delta Oshimili South 267 176888 0.540002714 0.212999186 0 0.00
13 Delta Warri South West 1757 137398 0.540000582 0.213001645 27 138.23
14 Delta Aniocha South 870 167471 0.53999797 0.212998071 0 0.00
15 Delta Patani 217 74454 0.539997851 0.213004002 3 0.00
16 Delta Warri South 634 367813 0.539999946 0.212999541 2 40.88
17 Delta Ukwuani 409 140341 0.539999002 0.213002615 0 0.00
18 Delta Ndokwa East 1608 121701 0.539995563 0.212997428 4 17.60
19 Delta Ughelli South 784 250700 0.54 0.212999601 3 32.53
20 Delta Ughelli North 820 378090 0.540001058 0.21299955 4 55.01
21 Delta Udu 131 167984 0.539997857 0.213002429 1 6.20
22 Delta Ethiope East 380 236911 0.540000253 0.212999818 1 4.70
23 Delta Ethiope West 537 238997 0.540001113 0.213000594 1 28.89
24 Delta Okpe 445 151381 0.540001718 0.212998989 0 37.61
25 Delta Bomadi 129 101413 0.539999803 0.213000306 0 10.40
26 Delta Oshimili North 510 139758 0.53999771 0.212996752 0 0.00
27 Delta Burutu 1927 245205 0.540001223 0.213001366 1 8.80
28 Delta Warri North 1855 160520 0.540001246 0.213001495 5 84.80
29 Delta Uvwie 95 222510 0.539998202 0.213001663 0 15.20
30 Delta Isoko North 478 169256 0.539998582 0.213002789 0 35.46
31 Delta Ika North East 464 215544 0.540001113 0.213000594 0 0.00
32 Delta Isoko South 705 277238 0.539998582 0.213002789 6 39.65
33 Delta Ika South 435 196964 0.540002234 0.212998314 0 0.00
34 Rivers Ahoada East 342 196096 0.469999388 0.212997715 4 42.07
35 Rivers Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni 968 334004 0.470000359 0.213000443 60 84.70
36 Rivers Andoni 233 256932 0.469999844 0.213001884 1 19.22
37 Rivers Degema 1009 294122 0.469998844 0.213000048 20 65.95
38 Rivers Ogu/Bolo 89 88757 0.470002366 0.212997285 0 0.00
39 Rivers Ahoada West 403 293232 0.469999864 0.212998581 31 52.89
40 Rivers Oyigbo 248 147765 0.470003045 0.213000372 10 43.02
41 Rivers Omumma 170 118357 0.469993325 0.212999654 5 1.48
42 Rivers Akuku Toru 1439 189940 0.470001053 0.212998842 22 118.06
43 Rivers Bonny 640 253465 0.469998519 0.213003109 10 67.68
44 Rivers Abua/Odual 704 332961 0.469997988 0.213000922 2 68.43
45 Rivers Etche 805 294678 0.470001154 0.212998595 14 10.10
46 Rivers Port Harcourt 109 634960 0.469999685 0.212999244 0 1.81
47 Rivers Obio/Akpor 260 545111 0.469999688 0.213000655 7 54.86
48 Rivers Ikwerre 656 222748 0.470001975 0.212998545 7 35.85
49 Rivers Gokana 126 275665 0.470001632 0.213001288 25 22.23
50 Rivers Tai 159 141843 0.469998519 0.213003109 0 19.18
51 Rivers Khana 560 345357 0.539998202 0.213001663 4 17.26
52 Rivers Okrika 222 262074 0.470000839 0.213000908 1 15.10
53 Rivers Asari Toru 113 259129 0.469997569 0.212998159 2 9.40
54 Rivers Eleme 138 224239 0.469998528 0.213000415 3 23.40
55 Rivers Opobo/Nkoro 130 180190 0.469998335 0.212997392 0 10.54
56 Rivers Emuohua 833 237046 0.470001603 0.213000852 3 76.02
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APPENDIX 2: RATE OF THEFT PER 30KM OF PIPELINE/BY LGA 
    
Serial State LGA Name Rate Per 30 km/LGA 
1 Bayelsa Southern Ijaw 134.21 
2 Bayelsa Ekeremor 55.91 
3 Bayelsa Kolokuma/Opokuma 5.80 
4 Bayelsa Yenegoa 36.40 
5 Bayelsa Sagbama 14.51 
6 Bayelsa Brass 51.46 
7 Bayelsa Ogbia 12.27 
8 Bayelsa Nembe 162.44 
9 Delta Ndokwa West 0.51 
10 Delta Sapele 1.84 
11 Delta Aniocha North 0.00 
12 Delta Oshimili South 0.00 
13 Delta Warri South West 31.92 
14 Delta Aniocha South 0.00 
15 Delta Patani 0.00 
16 Delta Warri South 4.29 
17 Delta Ukwuani 0.00 
18 Delta Ndokwa East 2.53 
19 Delta Ughelli South 13.08 
20 Delta Ughelli North 6.36 
21 Delta Udu 2.26 
22 Delta Ethiope East 1.69 
23 Delta Ethiope West 3.26 
24 Delta Okpe 3.80 
25 Delta Bomadi 3.79 
26 Delta Oshimili North 0.00 
27 Delta Burutu 3.84 
28 Delta Warri North 28.75 
29 Delta Uvwie 1.01 
30 Delta Isoko North 3.67 
31 Delta Ika North East 0.00 
32 Delta Isoko South 18.80 
33 Delta Ika South 0.00 
34 Rivers Ahoada East 29.15 
35 Rivers Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni 40.23 
36 Rivers Andoni 4.21 
37 Rivers Degema 55.30 
38 Rivers Ogu/Bolo 0.00 
39 Rivers Ahoada West 36.18 
40 Rivers Oyigbo 17.77 
41 Rivers Omumma 1.20 
42 Rivers Akuku Toru 72.90 
43 Rivers Bonny 44.56 
44 Rivers Abua/Odual 12.94 
45 Rivers Etche 1.26 
46 Rivers Port Harcourt 0.49 
47 Rivers Obio/Akpor 20.04 
48 Rivers Ikwerre 13.47 
49 Rivers Gokana 1.18 
50 Rivers Tai 10.46 
51 Rivers Khana 2.93 
52 Rivers Okrika 4.63 
53 Rivers Asari Toru 2.57 
54 Rivers Eleme 16.62 
55 Rivers Opobo/Nkoro 2.12 
56 Rivers Emuohua 4.10 
'Italics indicate LGAs with a rate of theft of over 50 per 30km of pipeline' 
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Figure 1: The Oil Infrastructure in the Study Areas of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers. 
 
 
Figure 2: Temporal Pattern of Crude Oil Thefts in the Niger Delta. 
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Figure 3: Volumes of Crude Oil Stolen Expressed as Average Number of Barrels Per Day.  
 
 
Figure 4: The Price of Oil Per Barrel in US Dollars for 2012 to 2014. 
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Figure 5: Number of Crude Oil Thefts by LGA. 
 
 
Figure 6: Rate Map of COT Incidents Per 30km of Pipeline Length. 
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Figure 7: Map of Major Hotspots of Crude Oil Theft from Jan 2012 to Dec 2014  
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